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Abstract— The media frequently describes the 2017 
Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’ rally as a turning point for the 
alt-right and white supremacist movements. Related research 
into social movements also suggests that the media attention and 
public discourse concerning the rally may have influenced the 
alt-right. Empirical evidence for these claims is largely lacking. 
The current study investigates potential effects of the rally by 
examining a dataset of 7,142 YouTube video transcripts from 
alt-right and progressive channels. We examine sentiment 
surrounding the ten most frequent keywords (single words and 
word pairs) in transcripts from each group, eight weeks before 
to eight weeks after the rally. In the majority of cases, no 
significant differences in sentiment were found within and 
between the alt-right and progressive groups, both pre- and 
post-Charlottesville. However, we did observe more negative 
sentiment trends surrounding ‘Bernie Sanders’ and ‘black 
people’ in the alt-right and progressive groups, respectively. We 
also observed more negative sentiment after the rally regarding 
‘Democratic Party’ in the alt-right videos compared to the 
progressive videos. We suggest that the observed results 
potentially reflect minor changes in political sentiment before 
and after the rally, as well as differences in political sentiment 
between the alt-right and progressive groups in general.  
Keywords—alt-right, charlottesville rally, sentiment analysis, 
youtube, quantitative text analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION  
On 11 and 12 August 2017, dozens of alt-right, white 
supremacist and neo-Nazi individuals descended on 
Charlottesville, Virginia. The event, known as the ‘Unite the 
Right’ rally, turned fatal on the second day when a white 
nationalist deliberately drove into a crowd of counter- 
protestors, resulting in the death of counter-protestor Heather 
Heyer and leaving several others injured (Hughes, 2018; Yan 
& Sayers, 2017). In recent years, the rise of the alt-right has 
been accompanied by several other acts of violence and terror 
attacks motivated by white supremacist ideologies, with 18 
out of 34 extremist-related deaths in 2017 attributed to this 
group (Anti-Defamation League, 2017). In 2018, all 50 
extremist murders in the United States were linked to right-
wing extremism (Anti-Defamation League, 2018). 
At the same time, alt-right ideologies have become 
widespread online. Their content is easily accessible through 
social media platforms, and ideas are amplified in echo 
chambers on extremist corners of the web (e.g., 4chan; Hine 
et al., 2017; and Gab; Zannettou et al., 2018). The video 
sharing platform YouTube has specifically been depicted by 
researchers and journalists as a breeding ground for the alt-
right (Ellis, 2018; Lewis, 2018). Online political influencers 
adopt strategies of mainstream popular Youtubers to gain 
popularity, engaging in tactics for search engine optimisation 
and cultivating a relatable ‘underdog’ image (Lewis, 2018). 
 The alt-right is not defined by a central organisation 
(Hodge & Hallgrimsdottir, 2019), nor does it ‘offer a coherent 
or well-developed set of policy proposals’ (Hawley, 2018, p. 
6). Instead, it has been referred to as a ‘mix of rightist online 
phenomena’ (Nagle, 2017, p. 15). Nonetheless, scholars have 
studied the alt-right as a social movement, following the 
definition of ‘a cluster of performances organised around a set 
of grievances or claims’ (Hodge & Hallgrimsdottir, 2019, p.2; 
see also Tilly, 1993). It has been argued that the alt-right, 
mainly through online activity, engages in promoting a shared 
identity, fostering commitment to a common cause, and 
proclaiming the ‘worthiness, unity, and size’ of its movement 
(Hodge & Hallgrimsdottir, 2019, p. 2).  
Elements of social movement theory propose that people 
engage in social identity performance, which refers to 
behaviour that serves to express the norms of the social group 
one aims to belong to (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Simon, 
Trötschel, & Dähne, 2008). Such behaviour may serve 
different purposes, namely to affirm ones social identity, to 
conform to a social movement, to strengthen ones identity, or 
to mobilise others (Klein et al., 2007). Within the context of 
the alt-right, social identity performance may for example 
include using community-specific language (see e.g. Hine et 
al., 2017) or memes online (e.g. Pepe the Frog, a popular 
internet meme appropriated by the alt-right; Hawley, 2018; 
see also Hine et al., 2017), or to don symbols related to white 
nationalism in public.  
After the Charlottesville rally, various media outlets have 
declared that ‘white nationalists are winning’ (Serwer, 2018), 
and ‘the genie is out of the bottle’ (Hughes, 2018). In addition, 
President Trump stated that there was ‘blame on both sides’ 
(Shear & Haberman, 2018), which prompted the suggestion 
that his claims ‘reinvigorated’ the alt-right movement (Shear 
& Haberman, 2018). In the aftermath of the rally, various 
reports also noted that white nationalists have entered 
mainstream conversation (Atkinson, 2018; Hughes, 2018) and 
some say they were aided in doing so by the Trump 
administration (Atkinson, 2018). Such claims potentially find 
some basis for support in the literature on the effect of media 
coverage and public discourse on social movements 
(Koopmans & Muis, 2009; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). 
Previous research on right wing violence in Germany suggests 
that positive as well as negative reactions from public figures 
to violent events may help to lend prominence to the 
movement (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). That is, even if one 
aims to condemn a violent movement’s message, it is still 
necessary to at least partially reproduce the message 
(Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). By studying newspaper sources, 
this line of research suggested that discursive opportunities, 
summarised as public visibility, resonance, and legitimacy 
affected the behaviour of right-wing movements (measured in 
terms of violent events against different target groups; 
Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Public visibility refers to the 
number of outlets reporting on the movement and the 
prominence of the movement’s message within those outlets 
(Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Resonance is defined as the 
(positive or negative) reaction from public figures to the 
movement’s message as well as the associated ripple effect in 
the media (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Lastly, legitimacy 
involves the general public’s support of a message (Koopmans 
& Olzak, 2004). Similar discursive opportunities were also 
studied in relation to the rise in popularity of right-wing 
populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands (Koopmans & Muis, 
2009). In a similar vein, visibility (e.g. the extensive media 
coverage), resonance (e.g. responses to the rally from 
President Trump and other politicians), and legitimacy (e.g. 
subsequent protests and vigils denouncing the rally; Peltz, 
2017) can be observed in the context of the alt-right and 
Charlottesville rally.  
The effect of these discursive opportunities on the alt-right 
following the rally have received little attention within the 
academic literature thus far. If indeed the visibility of the alt-
right increased following the rally, the message of the 
movement resonated in the media and public discourse, and 
the alt-right gained legitimacy through acknowledgement 
from opponents and the general public, we may expect to see 
changes in behaviour within the movement. Within the 
context of social identity performance, one may expect to see 
strengthened social identity consolidation within the alt-right 
movement as a result of the rally, President Trump’s 
comments, and the media coverage of the rally. After the rally, 
we might expect increased expression of norms from the alt-
right movement, for example in the form of stronger 
endorsement or more extreme expressions of in-group 
ideology. As has been raised previously, such behaviour may 
serve to further strengthen the movement or mobilise others to 
join. 
Empirical examinations of these possibilities are thus far 
lacking. Moreover, reactions to the rally have yet to be 
comprehensively examined for YouTube, seen as one of the 
hotbeds of alt-right online activity (Lewis, 2018). It can be 
argued that understanding the effect of external events on 
extremist groups on social media may be of particular interest 
to policy makers and security officials aiming to prevent or 
de-escalate violence. One way in which reactions to an event 
within a movement can be measured is by modelling language 
use of the movement across a time window surrounding an 
event of interest. In the following section, we discuss previous 
efforts at doing so.  
                                                        
1  See https://hatebase.org/, http://www.rsdb.org/ and 
https://www.adl.org/education-and-resources/resource-knowledge-
base/hate-symbols  
II. LINGUISTIC EFFECTS OF EXOGENOUS EVENTS 
The effect of extremism-related events on social media 
behaviour has been previously examined in a few cases. In a 
qualitative study of Twitter accounts of alt-right (Proud Boys 
& Oath Keepers) and far-left (Antifa) organisations in the six 
weeks leading up to the rally, it was observed that the two 
sides frequently targeted each other, framing the opposing 
group as the enemy (Klein, 2019). Manual examination of the 
tweets showed that the alt-right accounts frequently referred 
to ‘the left’ and ‘liberals’ as unpatriotic and communist, a clear 
example of the tension between alt-right supporters and left-
leaning individuals and organisations. At the same time, the 
Antifa accounts dubbed the alt-right ‘suit and tie Nazis’. 
Furthermore, both the alt-right and far left groups incited 
violence in the weeks leading up to the Charlottesville rally 
and called for action among their supporters. A tweet from one 
of the alt-right groups read ‘The left is preparing lynch mobs 
to descend on the Unite The Right rally in Charlottesville, 
VA... This is going to be fun.’ (p. 311, Klein, 2019).  
Beyond the Charlottesville rally, the effect of Islamist 
terrorism and Islamophobic attacks on hate speech has also 
been measured on Twitter and Reddit (Olteanu, Castillo, Boy, 
& Varshney, 2018). Using a dataset of 150 million messages 
spanning 19 months, hate speech was measured shortly after 
13 extremist attacks and compared to predicted hate speech 
had no such event occurred. It was found that following 
Islamist terrorist attacks hate speech targeting Muslims, 
particularly those advocating violence, increased (Olteanu et 
al., 2018). At the same time, an increase in messages 
countering hate speech (e.g. defending Muslims) after Islamist 
terrorist attacks was observed (Olteanu et al., 2018). In 
contrast, following Islamophobic attacks, an increase in hate 
speech targeting Muslims was not found, with the exception 
of messages posted after the 2017 Finsbury Park Mosque 
attack (Olteanu et al., 2018). 
Other investigations have examined changes in language 
over time in the context of political change. For example, hate 
speech and white nationalist rhetoric on Twitter have been 
examined during the 2016 election period in order to 
empirically examine wide-spread media coverage of the the 
rise in hate speech as a result of the Donald Trump’s divisive 
election campaign (Siegel et al., 2018). Using a dataset of 750 
million tweets referring to Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton 
between June 15, 2015 (the day after the Trump candidacy 
was announced) and June 15, 2017, contrasted with a random 
sample of 400 million tweets from American Twitter users, 
hate speech and white nationalist language was measured with 
a dictionary approach using Hatebase, the Racial Slur 
Database, and the Anti-Defamation League’s database of 
white-nationalist language1 (Siegel et al., 2018). The tweets 
were examined by means of an interrupted time series 
analysis, to investigate whether hate speech increased during 
the Trump campaign or after Trump’s election. Although a 
spike in hate speech was observed in the Trump dataset 
following the imposed travel ban in early 2017, no significant 
lasting increase of hate speech or white nationalist language 
was observed in the Trump, Clinton, or random sample data 
(Siegel et al., 2018). 
III. CURRENT STUDY 
The present study takes a closer look at a population of alt-
right content creators (hereafter, ‘alternative group’) by 
examining a new dataset of YouTube video transcripts 
extracted from channels by individuals ‘who range in ideology 
from mainstream libertarian to openly white nationalist’ 
(Ellis, 2018). These video transcripts are contrasted with those 
extracted from YouTube channels whose political sentiment 
can be considered more progressive (hereafter, ‘progressive 
group’), what might be considered ‘the left’. This paper 
centres around the question whether we can observe the effect 
of the Charlottesville rally on language use on YouTube in the 
alternative and progressive groups. We specifically examine 
language in terms of sentiment regarding specific frequent 
words that appear in the video transcripts. In other words, we 
study whether the alternative and progressive groups speak 
positively or negative about specific concepts, and how these 
sentiments develop over time before and after the rally.  
Since this paper is among the first to examine language use 
before and after the rally, we do not postulate any directional 
hypotheses about changes in language use (e.g. more positive 
or negative language use regarding specific concepts). 
However, in light of the social movement and social identity 
performance literature, we do expect to see changes in social 
identity performance after the rally reflected in language use 
on YouTube. The rationale for examining changes after the 
rally is further derived from previous research on social 
movements examining the effects of discourse opportunities 
on the behaviour of social movements (Koopmans & Muis, 
2009; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). We include progressive 
channels in our analysis to examine whether this opposing 
group reacts to changes in social identity performance on part 
of the alternative group, or perhaps exhibits changes in social 
identity performance itself as a consequence of the violent 
rally.  In short, the current study examines the following 
questions: 
1. Is there difference in sentiment surrounding frequent 
keywords before versus after the Charlottesville rally, 
in both the alternative and progressive YouTube 
channels? 
2. Is there a difference in sentiment surrounding 
frequent keywords in alternative versus progressive 
YouTube channels, both before and after 
Charlottesville?  
In other words, this study examines the sentiment 
surrounding frequent keywords both within and between the 
alternative and progressive channels. This analysis looks at a 
time-frame of sixteen weeks surrounding Charlottesville, in 
order to assess potential effects of the rally.    
IV. DATA 
A. Channel selection 
YouTube channels for analysis were selected from two 
main sources. Firstly, we drew from the list of 65 YouTube 
users referred to as the ‘Alternative Influence Network’ in the 
2018 Data & Society report2 on political influencers (Lewis, 
2018). Based on this list, we searched for a designated 
                                                        
2  https://datasociety.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/DS_Alternative_Influence.pdf 
3  http://the2020progressive.com/top-13-progressive-news-shows-
youtube/ and https://medium.com/@tejazz89/top-5-youtube-channels-to-
follow-if-you-are-a-true-progressive-ee2abc78d58f 
YouTube channel for each individual. If an individual did not 
have a designated YouTube channel or their channel was no 
longer available, we searched for the individual’s name 
through the YouTube search function. For example, videos 
featuring Alex Jones (who no longer has a designated channel) 
were obtained by means of the search query ‘alex jones full 
show’. This first group of alternative YouTube channels 
consisted of 56 channels and search queries to be considered 
for transcript retrieval. The second source for video selection 
were two online lists of progressive YouTube channels3. Since 
the lists referred to specific existing channels, search queries 
for specific persons were not necessary. In total, 13 
progressive channels were considered for transcript retrieval. 
For all channels and search queries, we retrieved the URLs for 
all available videos.  
B. Transcript retrieval 
The method for retrieving YouTube video transcripts 
follows the procedure of related research (Kleinberg, Mozes, 
& van der Vegt, 2018; Soldner et al., 2019). In order to retrieve 
the transcripts, a Python script was written that makes use of 
www.downsub.com, a website that provides YouTube 
transcripts when the video URL is entered. The transcripts 
downloaded through the script were either automatically 
generated on YouTube or manually added by the YouTube 
user. In some cases, no transcript was available, because users 
can also disable transcript availability. The resulting 
collection of transcripts were XML-encoded, with time-
stamped word sequences (e.g. 00:05-00:07 “Hello 
everyone!”). XML-tags and time-stamps were removed, 
resulting in a single string for each video transcript.  
C. Data cleaning 
Videos that contained fewer than 100 words were not 
considered for analysis. Each video was checked for English 
language, and was excluded if it contained fewer than 50% 
English words. Videos were also excluded if they contained 
fewer than 90% ASCII characters. The video transcripts were 
made lower-case and cleaned by removing stop-words with 
the tidytext R package  (Silge & Robinson, 2019), as well as 
unnecessary whitespace and punctuation with the tm (Feinerer 
& Hornik, 2018) and qdap (Rinker, 2019) R packages.  
D. Sample 
For the purpose of analysing potential effects of the rally 
on sentiment surrounding specific keywords, we selected 
videos from the dataset that were posted between eight weeks 
prior to the Charlottesville rally, to eight weeks after the rally. 
This resulted in sixteen time-segments for the progressive and 
alternative groups.  The division of videos per time-segment 
as well as the dates for each are depicted in Figure 1. 
Descriptive statistics for this sample are given in Table 1.  
TABLE I.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS SAMPLE (MEAN, SD) 
 Alternative Progressive 
Total number of videos 2,684 4,458 
Total word count 3,868,744 2,804,703 
Mean word count (SD) 1,448 (1,612) 632 (860) 
Mean view count (SD) 120,639 (234,513) 24,787 (47,468) 
 
 V. METHOD 
A. Keyword selection 
To assess possible effects of the rally on sentiment 
surrounding specific keywords in the video transcripts, we 
extract the ten unigrams and bigrams with the highest 
proportional occurrence in both groups (frequency of n-gram 
divided by total tokens in the corpus). Only adjectives and 
nouns were considered because we consider these parts-of-
speech to convey the most meaning. If two n-grams within the 
top ten represented the same concept (e.g. ‘donald trump’ and 
‘president trump’) the n-gram with the higher proportion was 
selected and the duplicate(s) were not considered for selection. 
The final lists of unigrams and bigrams were used as keywords 
to extract ‘keywords in context’ by means of the quanteda R 
package (Benoit et al., 2018). This procedure looks for each 
occurrence of a keyword in every video transcript, then 
extracts it along with a window of five words preceding and 
five words following each keyword, representing the context 
around the keyword instance. For example, the context 
‘counsel robert muller investigating president’ may precede 
the keyword ‘trump’, followed by ‘obstruction justice 
investigating trumps son-in-law’ (note that the stop-words 
have been removed here). Thereafter, a sentiment analysis is 
performed on the context windows (the keyword in question 
is excluded from sentiment analysis). The sentiment analysis 
is performed by means of the sentimentr R package (Rinker, 
2019), which takes valence shifters into account. The 
sentiment analysis is repeated for all instances of keywords 
and its windows, for both unigram and bigram keywords, 
across all time-segments and in both progressive and 
alternative groups. Based on this, the average sentiment scores 
for the context around each keyword are computed for each 
time-segment. In addition to this, we also computed the 
average sentiment for each keyword during the Charlottesville 
rally following the same procedure. 
 Once weekly sentiment scores have been computed 
for each keyword, average sentiment was compared by means 
of independent sample t-tests between 1) pre-Charlottesville 
and post-Charlottesville, for both alternative and progressive 
groups separately, and 2) pre-Charlottesville in the 
progressive versus alternative group, and post-Charlottesville 
in the progressive versus alternative groups. See Figure 2 for 
a graphic representation of the comparisons. Finally, a 
Bonferroni correction was applied to make up for the two 
comparisons for each time segment, resulting in an alpha level 
of 0.05/4 = 0.0125. 
In addition to testing differences in average sentiment, 
differences in slope for the same four comparisons (see Figure 
2) were computed. This procedure enables us to assess 
whether there was a difference in sentiment trends between 
and within groups. Slope comparisons were performed by 
computing z-scores for the differences in slope in line with the 
formula below (Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 
1998). 
Formula 1. Z-score for differences in slope 𝑧 = 	 𝑏%	&	𝑏'(𝑆𝐸𝑏%+	'	 𝑆𝐸𝑏'	'	 
Where b1 and b2 represent the slopes for the time segments 
to be compared, and SEb1 and SEb2 the standard errors of the 
respective slopes. Again, a Bonferroni correction was applied 
resulting in an alpha level of 0.05/4 = 0.0125. 
VI. RESULTS 
A. Keyword selection 
A list of unigrams and bigrams with the highest 
proportional occurrence in the total progressive and 
alternative groups was generated, and the first 10 nouns and 
adjectives were selected to serve as keywords across all time-
segments. Since there was a large degree of overlap between 
the two groups, this resulted in a list of 14 total unigrams and 
13 total bigrams depicted in Table 2. Although the table 
presents n-gram frequencies within both groups, the selection 
of n-grams was done based on the proportions of occurrence 
(frequency of n-gram divided by total tokens in each group).  
TABLE II.  UNIGRAM AND BIGRAM FREQUENCIES  
a. The superscript ‘b’ denotes the n-gram occurred in the top 10 of both the progressive and 
alternative groups, ‘p’ means it occurred in the top 10 of the progressive group, and ‘a’ in the 
alternative group (all in terms of proportions). 
 
 
 
Unigrams Alt. Progr. Bigrams Alt. Progr. 
peopleb 55662 42641 donald trumpb 4500 7157 
trumpb 15418 21487 health careb 2167 4025 
timeb 14290 10663 bernie sandersb 1871 3215 
fuckinga 10660 4613 democratic partyb 1195 2358 
whiteb 8486 6248 hillary clintonb  1506 2142 
careb 6388 8396 puerto ricob 1142 1171 
countryp 6153 7441 white houseb 1100 1816 
moneyb 6754 7179 black peoplea 1123 591 
guya 7772 5295 north koreap 1048 1583 
partyp 4519 6837 health insurancep 552 1279 
talkb 8814 6695 free speecha 1091 644 
shita 6724 3330 climate changep 982 1235 
healthp 3610 6546 white peoplea  1064 397 
stuffa 6407 3665    
 
Fig. 1. Dates of time-segments (all 2017) and number of videos in each.  
Line one represents the dates of the sixteen weeks surrounding 
Charlottesville. Line two and three show the number of progressive and 
alternative videos per week, respectively.  
 
Pre-Charlottesville 
alternative videos
Post-Charlottesville 
alternative videos
Pre-Charlottesville 
progressive videos
Post-Charlottesville 
progressive videos
1
1
22
Fig. 2. Depiction of time-segment comparisons 
After establishing the context around each keyword (five 
words pre- and post-keyword) in all videos across the 
progressive and alternative groups, the average sentiment 
score was computed for the context surrounding each keyword 
for each time-segment, as well as the average score during the 
Charlottesville rally. We show plots with sentiment scores per 
time-segment for ‘people’ (Figure 3), ‘trump’ (Figure 4), 
‘bernie sanders’ (Figure 5), ‘black people’ (Figure 6), and 
‘democratic party’ (Figure 7). Each figure shows sentiment 
scores per week for the alternative (red) and progressive (blue) 
group. Trendlines (dashed blue and red) are depicted for the 
pre- and post- Charlottesville measurements separately. The 
dashed black line in the centre represents the Charlottesville 
rally. Remaining plots are available on the Open Science 
Framework:  
https://osf.io/yedt7/?view_only=ec235ff877d24731ad5140e2
4c7a6cdd 
B. Unigram differences pre- and post-Charlottesville 
For both the alternative and progressive groups, average 
sentiment was compared between pre-and post-Charlottesville 
measurements. Table 3 shows average sentiment values, as 
well as the results of the t-tests within both groups. We see a 
significant difference in sentiment surrounding the unigram 
‘people’ in the alternative group (p < 0.0125), with post-
Charlottesville sentiment being more negative than pre-
Charlottesville sentiment.  
In addition to this, time-series models were built for both 
the pre- and post-Charlottesville sentiment measures of each 
unigram (four models per unigram). Table 4 shows the pre- 
and post-Charlottesville slopes for both groups, as well as a z-
score and associated p-value representing the difference 
between the pre- and post-Charlottesville slopes for each 
unigram. We do not see any significant differences in slope 
between pre- and post-Charlottesville measurements in either 
groups (p > 0.0125). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Sentiment measurements for ‘people’ across time-segments  
 
Fig. 4. Sentiment for ‘trump’ across time segments 
 
Fig. 5. Sentiment for ‘bernie sanders’ across time segments 
 
Fig. 6. Sentiment for ‘black people’ across time segments 
 
Fig. 7. Sentiment for ‘democratic party’ across time segments 
TABLE III.  WITHIN GROUP PRE- AND POST-CHARLOTTESVILLE MEAN 
UNIGRAM SENTIMENT AND SENTIMENT DIFFERENCES 
b. Differences represent: bpost – bpre  (a negative value indicates that the sentiment post-Charlottesville 
is more negative than pre-Charlottesville) 
TABLE IV.  WITHIN GROUP PRE- AND POST-CHARLOTTESVILLE UNIGRAM 
SLOPES AND SLOPE DIFFERENCES 
c. Differences represent: bpost – bpre  (a negative value indicates that the slope post-Charlottesville 
decreased in contrast to the slope pre-Charlottesville) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Unigram Alternative Progressive 
 pre post diff t p pre post diff t p 
people -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -3.27 0.006* -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -2.21 0.051 
trump -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.06 0.954 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -1.31 0.227 
time -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.29 0.773 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.53 0.607 
fucking -0.14 -0.16 -0.03 -2.44 0.032 -0.13 -0.14 -0.01 -1.15 0.268 
white -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.37 0.716 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.76 0.459 
care 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.61 0.555 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.22 0.829 
country -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -2.22 0.045 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -1.54 0.148 
money 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.89 0.390 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.96 0.355 
guy -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.09 0.934 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.23 0.826 
party -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.32 0.752 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.67 0.519 
talk 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.71 0.491 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -1.95 0.078 
shit -0.11 -0.13 -0.01 -1.28 0.227 -0.12 -0.11 0.00 0.26 0.797 
health 0.13 0.10 -0.03 -0.99 0.347 0.15 0.15 0.00 -0.18 0.859 
stuff -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -1.09 0.297 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 2.07 0.057 
 
Unigram Alternative Progressive 
 pre post diff z p pre post diff z p 
people -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.41 0.680 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.996 
trump 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.28 0.776 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.32 0.752 
time -0.02 0.06 0.07 0.44 0.657 0.28 0.17 -0.11 -0.64 0.523 
fucking 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -0.80 0.421 -0.02 -0.14 -0.12 -0.48 0.630 
white -0.15 0.20 0.35 1.86 0.063 0.31 0.31 0.00 -0.01 0.995 
care -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.28 0.777 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.60 0.546 
country 0.27 0.46 0.19 0.92 0.357 0.21 0.08 -0.12 -0.65 0.516 
money -0.03 0.08 0.11 0.60 0.546 -0.04 0.16 0.21 1.16 0.247 
guy 0.06 0.23 0.17 1.17 0.243 0.27 0.02 -0.25 -0.79 0.430 
party 0.13 0.35 0.22 0.65 0.518 0.10 -0.07 -0.17 -0.74 0.460 
talk 0.15 0.26 0.11 0.65 0.516 0.19 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.822 
shit 0.21 0.13 -0.08 -0.31 0.756 0.13 0.06 -0.07 -0.22 0.830 
health 0.11 -0.25 -0.36 -0.50 0.618 0.30 -0.17 -0.47 -1.22 0.223 
stuff 0.17 0.16 -0.01 -0.06 0.949 0.04 0.18 0.14 0.54 0.586 
 
C. Unigram differences alternative versus progressive 
group 
We also compared average sentiment for each unigram 
between the progressive and alternative groups, both pre- and 
post-Charlottesville. Table 5 shows average sentiment values, 
as well as the results of the t-tests between both groups. We 
do not see any significant differences in average unigram 
sentiment between groups (p > 0.0125). 
The slopes of the timeseries models for each unigram were 
also compared between the progressive and alternative 
groups, both pre- and post-Charlottesville. Table 6 shows the 
measures of differences for each unigram between the 
progressive and alternative groups within the pre-
Charlottesville time-segments, as well as the difference 
between the two groups within the post-Charlottesville time-
segments. Differences in slope were computed by subtracting 
the slope of the alternative groups from the slope of the 
progressive group, and computing the associated z-score. We 
do not see any significant differences in unigram sentiment 
slopes between groups (p > 0.0125). 
TABLE V.  BETWEEN-GROUP PRE- AND POST-CHARLOTTESVILLE MEAN 
UNIGRAM SENTIMENT AND SENTIMENT DIFFERENCE 
Unigram Pre-Charlottesville  Post-Charlottesville  
 diff t p diff t p 
people 0.00 1.19 0.255 0.00 0.33 0.752 
trump 0.01 1.16 0.283 0.00 -0.10 0.925 
time 0.00 -0.18 0.859 -0.01 -1.08 0.300 
fucking 0.01 1.08 0.302 0.02 2.01 0.065 
white 0.02 1.80 0.096 0.01 0.84 0.418 
care 0.01 2.32 0.037 0.02 1.73 0.111 
country -0.01 -0.91 0.378 0.00 0.41 0.690 
money 0.02 2.02 0.063 0.02 2.12 0.052 
guy 0.00 -0.07 0.942 0.00 -0.32 0.756 
party 0.02 2.33 0.041 0.01 0.82 0.425 
talk 0.01 1.27 0.224 -0.01 -0.47 0.644 
shit 0.00 -0.02 0.987 0.02 1.52 0.155 
health 0.02 1.52 0.155 0.05 1.53 0.154 
stuff -0.02 -2.50 0.029 0.01 0.97 0.347 
d. Differences represent: bprogressive – balternative (a negative value indicates the sentiment for the 
alternative group is more positive than that of the progressive group) 
 
TABLE VI.  BETWEEN-GROUP PRE- AND POST-CHARLOTTESVILLE 
UNIGRAM SLOPES AND SLOPE DIFFERENCES  
Unigram Pre-Charlottesville  Post-Charlottesville  
 diff z p diff z p 
people 0.16 2.21 0.027 0.13 0.85 0.393 
trump -0.11 -0.64 0.523 -0.12 -0.60 0.545 
time 0.30 1.80 0.072 0.12 0.68 0.494 
fucking -0.22 -1.02 0.306 -0.14 -0.50 0.619 
white 0.46 2.29 0.022 0.11 0.40 0.691 
care 0.07 0.48 0.633 0.24 0.93 0.354 
country -0.06 -0.29 0.769 -0.37 -1.95 0.051 
money -0.02 -0.10 0.919 0.08 0.47 0.637 
guy 0.21 1.37 0.169 -0.21 -0.68 0.495 
party -0.03 -0.14 0.885 -0.43 -1.28 0.201 
talk 0.04 0.28 0.782 -0.02 -0.08 0.934 
shit -0.09 -0.29 0.769 -0.07 -0.26 0.794 
health 0.19 0.61 0.542 0.07 0.10 0.920 
stuff -0.13 -0.66 0.510 0.02 0.08 0.937 
e. Differences represent: bprogressive – balternative 
 
 
D. Bigram differences pre- and post-Charlottesville  
Following the same procedure as with the unigrams, 
average bigram sentiment was compared between pre-and 
post-Charlottesville measurements for both groups. In Table 
7, we see a significant difference in sentiment surrounding the 
bigram ‘climate change’ in the progressive group (p < 
0.0125), with post-Charlottesville sentiment being more 
negative than pre-Charlottesville sentiment.  
We also built timeseries models for pre- and post-
Charlottesville sentiment measures of each bigram (four 
models per bigram). Table 8 shows the pre- and post-
Charlottesville slopes and slope differences within each 
group. In the alternative group, we see a significant difference 
between pre- and post-Charlottesville measurements 
surrounding ‘bernie sanders’, with a positive trend pre-
Charlottesville and a negative trend post-Charlottesville (see 
also Figure 5). Note that the positive trend does not necessarily 
imply positive sentiment, since average sentiment pre-
Charlottesville was -0.01 (Table 7). In the progressive group, 
we see a significantly more negative sentiment slope post-
Charlottesville surrounding ‘black people’, compared to a 
positive trend pre-Charlottesville (p < 0.0125). Trend lines are 
also shown in Figure 6.   
E. Bigram differences alternative versus progressive group 
We also compared average sentiment for each bigram between 
the progressive and alternative groups, both pre- and post-
Charlottesville. Table 9 shows average sentiment values, as 
well as the results of the t-tests between both groups. We see 
differences in sentiment between groups for ‘democratic 
party’ post-Charlottesville, with more negative sentiment in 
the alternative group than the progressive group (p < 0.0125).  
We also computed the differences in slope between the 
progressive and alternative groups for each bigram within the 
same time window (pre- or post-Charlottesville), depicted in 
Table 10. Pre-Charlottesville, the progressive group shows a 
significantly larger slope for ‘black people’ (p < 0.0125, see 
also Figure 6). Post-Charlottesville, we observe a significantly 
more negative slope in the alternative group surrounding 
‘bernie sanders’ than in the progressive group (p < 0.0125, see 
also Figure 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE VII.  WITHIN GROUP PRE- AND POST-CHARLOTTESVILLE MEAN 
BIGRAM SENTIMENT AND SENTIMENT DIFFERENCES 
TABLE VIII.  WITHIN GROUP PRE- AND POST-CHARLOTTESVILLE BIGRAM 
SLOPES AND SLOPE DIFFERENCES 
TABLE IX.  BETWEEN-GROUP PRE- AND POST-CHARLOTTESVILLE 
BIGRAM SENTIMENT AND SENTIMENT DIFFERENCES   
 
 
  
Unigram Alternative Progressive 
 pre post diff t p pre post diff t p 
donald trump -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.993 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -1.08 0.302 
health care 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.82 0.435 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.86 0.406 
bernie sanders -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.94 0.363 -0.01 0.00 0.02 1.31 0.210 
democratic party -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.35 0.733 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.918 
hillary clinton -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.38 0.713 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 2.53 0.026 
white house -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.50 0.629 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.720 
black people -0.10 -0.11 0.00 -0.25 0.807 -0.12 -0.08 0.04 1.18 0.263 
north korea -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.17 0.866 -0.07 -0.12 -0.05 -1.78 0.108 
health insurance -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.800 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.23 0.825 
free speech 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.99 0.343 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.55 0.590 
climate change 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -1.44 0.185 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -3.06 0.011* 
white people -0.07 -0.07 0.00 -0.25 0.808 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.41 0.690 
 
Word Alternative Progressive 
 pre post diff z p pre post diff z p 
donald trump 0.27 0.35 0.08 0.20 0.839 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.963 
health care 0.72 -0.31 -1.03 -1.11 0.265 0.33 0.04 -0.29 -1.11 0.265 
bernie sanders 0.88 -1.11 -1.99 -3.05 0.002* 0.32 0.16 -0.15 -0.61 0.544 
democratic party -0.26 -0.03 0.23 0.30 0.764 0.37 0.09 -0.29 -0.93 0.350 
hillary clinton 0.39 0.66 0.27 0.29 0.771 -0.09 0.18 0.27 1.22 0.221 
white house -0.38 0.47 0.85 1.44 0.151 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.35 0.726 
black people -0.13 0.19 0.32 0.85 0.396 1.39 -0.28 -1.66 -2.67 0.008* 
north korea 0.21 -0.27 -0.48 -0.45 0.651 -0.51 -0.07 0.44 0.62 0.538 
health insurance -0.03 -1.01 -0.97 -0.51 0.613 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.795 
free speech 0.23 0.18 -0.05 -0.12 0.905 -0.84 -0.13 0.71 0.69 0.488 
climate change -0.50 -0.90 -0.40 -0.39 0.697 -0.24 0.57 0.81 2.14 0.032 
white people -0.36 0.16 0.52 1.64 0.101 0.33 -0.21 -0.53 -0.70 0.483 
 
Word Pre-Charlottesville Post-Charlottesville 
 diff t p diff t p 
donald trump 0.01 1.00 0.344 0.01 0.52 0.612 
health care -0.02 -1.24 0.242 0.02 0.56 0.588 
bernie sanders 0.00 -0.17 0.868 0.04 1.73 0.117 
democratic party 0.05 1.55 0.158 0.06 3.30 0.006* 
hillary clinton 0.00 0.05 0.958 0.04 1.09 0.310 
white house 0.01 1.19 0.262 0.01 0.21 0.842 
black people -0.02 -0.64 0.534 0.02 1.24 0.245 
north korea -0.02 -0.52 0.611 -0.06 -1.51 0.170 
health insurance 0.02 0.53 0.609 0.00 -0.01 0.993 
free speech -0.01 -0.38 0.707 -0.05 -1.47 0.181 
climate change -0.02 -1.17 0.264 -0.01 -0.22 0.833 
white people 0.03 1.15 0.278 0.05 2.30 0.044 
 
TABLE X.  BETWEEN-GROUP PRE- AND POST-
CHARLOTTESVILLE BIGRAM SLOPES AND SLOPE DIFFERENCES 
VII. DISCUSSION 
The present study assessed whether an effect of the 
Charlottesville Unite the Right rally can be observed on 
alternative and progressive YouTube video channels. We 
expected to see differences in language use after 
Charlottesville due to the discursive opportunities lent to the 
alt-right movement as a result of the rally, potentially resulting 
in increased social identity performance. Specifically, we 
extracted frequent n-grams and examined the sentiment 
surrounding each to see if there was an effect of the rally on 
sentiment relating to specific concepts. First, we examined 
whether there was a difference in sentiment surrounding 
frequent unigrams and bigrams before versus after the 
Charlottesville rally, in both the alternative and progressive 
YouTube channels separately. At the unigram level, we 
mostly did not observe any differences in average sentiment 
or sentiment trends, suggesting that sentiment regarding the 
keywords examined did not change significantly before and 
after the rally. We only observed more negative average 
sentiment surrounding ‘people’ after the rally in the 
alternative group. Possibly, this shows a more negative 
outlook on ‘people’ after the rally, but unigrams unfortunately 
do not provide enough context for us to draw such 
conclusions. Indeed, the unigram ‘people’ may occur as ‘black 
people’, ‘rich people’ or ‘white people’, which may be 
referred to with very different sentiments within and across 
videos. Therefore, effects of the rally may have been averaged 
out due to different contexts, suggesting that unigrams were 
perhaps less insightful than bigrams for the purpose of this 
study. Therefore, we turn to bigrams to gain a deeper insight 
into the transcripts.  
When comparing pre- and post-Charlottesville average 
bigram sentiment in both groups separately, we only observed 
more negative average sentiment after the rally for ‘climate 
change’ in the progressive group. However, it is unclear to 
what extent the rally in particular may have influenced this 
change in mean sentiment. In terms of sentiment trends, 
differences were observed for the bigrams ‘bernie sanders’ 
and ‘black people’. Regarding ‘bernie sanders’, we see that 
the slope surrounding this bigram in the alternative group 
significantly changes from a positive slope (albeit negative 
average sentiment) to a negative slope (still negative average 
sentiment) after the rally. Interestingly, Bernie Sanders made 
strong statements on the rally, stating: ‘The white nationalist 
demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia, is a reprehensible 
display of racism and hatred [...] I am disgusted by the news 
[...] While this incident is alarming, it is not surprising [...].’ 
However, a detailed content analysis of the videos referring to 
Bernie Sanders post-Charlottesville will be needed to confirm 
whether there is an explicit relationship between his 
statements and the sentiment observed in the alternative 
group. Nevertheless, this result potentially reflects the concept 
of resonance as a discourse opportunity (Koopmans & Olzak, 
2004), where negative attention from a public actor further 
disseminates a movement’s message, resulting in potential 
behavior changes on part of the social movement. 
Furthermore, we also observed a change from a positive slope 
(albeit negative average sentiment) to a negative slope (still 
negative average sentiment) in the progressive group for the 
bigram ‘black people’. This result could perhaps be explained 
by an increased sense of threat towards black people from 
white supremacists post-Charlottesville. Again, follow-up 
research will be needed to examine whether this is also 
explicitly stated in the context of ‘black people’ in post-
Charlottesville videos.  
We also investigated whether there was a difference in 
sentiment surrounding important unigrams and bigrams in 
alternative versus progressive YouTube channels, both before 
and after Charlottesville separately. We observed no 
significant differences between groups in average sentiment 
surrounding unigrams, neither before nor after the rally. 
Again, the contextual ambiguity of unigrams may explain this. 
In the bigram tests, we saw more negative average sentiment 
for ‘democratic party’ in the alternative group versus the 
progressive group after the rally, which may be explained 
through general political sentiment in both groups. Indeed, the 
alternative group may be more likely to harbour negative 
sentiment towards the Democrats than the progressive group. 
In terms of sentiment trends, we observed a difference 
between the two groups for the bigram ‘bernie sanders’, with 
progressive videos showing a higher slope than alternative 
videos post-Charlottesville. Again, this may have to do with 
comments made by Sanders after the rally and how they were 
received in the progressive group versus the alternative group.  
In short, the current results suggest that there are some 
minor differences in language use both within and between 
alternative and progressive groups in a sixteen week 
timeframe around the Charlottesville rally. Results possibly 
reflect political sentiment before and after the rally, as well as 
potential differences in general political sentiment between 
both groups. However, we acknowledge additional research 
will be needed to examine the precise contexts that give rise 
to positive and negative sentiment observed in the present 
study.  
A. Limitations 
The current study is not without limitations. First, the data 
sources that we have drawn on for the YouTube videos were 
unbalanced in nature. Although the progressive sample 
consisted of more videos than the alternative sample, the 
progressive sample was made up of fewer channels than the 
alternative sample. This was due to the fact that we were able 
to attain a large list of alternative YouTube channels through 
the Data & Society report, but no similar report or collection 
exists for progressive YouTube channels. Furthermore, the 
two groups also differed in terms of view counts and video 
length, both factors which may have impacted on language use 
and sentiment. Indeed, previous research has raised the 
Word Pre-Charlottesville Post-Charlottesville 
 diff z p diff z p 
donald 
trump -0.21 -0.62 0.533 -0.30 -1.04 0.300 
health care -0.39 -1.46 0.145 0.35 0.38 0.701 
bernie 
sanders -0.56 -1.02 0.307 1.27 2.95 0.003* 
democratic 
party 0.63 0.88 0.378 0.11 0.27 0.787 
hillary 
clinton -0.49 -1.33 0.182 -0.48 -0.55 0.582 
white house 0.43 1.68 0.093 -0.34 -0.58 0.562 
black 
people 1.52 2.65 0.008* -0.46 -1.04 0.299 
north korea -0.72 -0.93 0.350 0.21 0.20 0.840 
health 
insurance 0.04 0.04 0.970 1.16 0.69 0.491 
free speech -1.07 -1.65 0.099 -0.31 -0.34 0.734 
climate 
change 0.26 0.82 0.414 1.47 1.41 0.160 
white 
people 0.69 1.05 0.292 -0.37 -0.73 0.467 
 
possibility of external factors, such as gender (Kleinberg, 
Mozes, & van der Vegt, 2018) and political leaning (Soldner 
et al., 2019), influencing sentiment styles in YouTube videos. 
In addition, while the alternative channels were drawn from a 
research report, the list of progressive channels were drawn 
from user-generated online lists. Future research may be 
aimed at curating an expert-verified or crowd-sourced dataset 
of channels with different political biases4.  
Regarding the keyword in context analysis, no consensus 
seems to exist in the literature as to the length of the keyword 
windows. We adhered to the default setting in the quanteda R 
package (Benoit et al., 2018) of five words pre- and post-
keyword, but would encourage others to use the code and data 
of the current study to explore variations of these parameters. 
Furthermore, the video transcripts contained no punctuation in 
part due to the nature of automatic transcriptions, which may 
have additionally impacted the sentiment analysis. That is, the 
window surrounding a keyword may include a word that 
belongs to what would be perceived as a previous or next 
sentence or phrase. Since the sequence of video transcripts 
were represented as a single string per time-segment, a word 
from a previous or next video may have been included in the 
keyword context as well. Alternatively, a word that may have 
been a valence shifter may not have been included in the 
context windows. Although these matters may have had an 
impact on the sentiment analysis, this is unfortunately 
unavoidable due to unpunctuated nature of the transcripts.  
Lastly, the sentiment scores were aggregated over each 
week. These aggregations will inevitably have resulted in loss 
of information. However, due to the nature of the dataset this 
particular unit of measurement were necessary. Since we 
sought videos with specific keywords in their transcripts, the 
sample was narrowed down significantly. That is, to analyse 
the sentiment surrounding ‘hillary clinton’, we could only 
make use of videos in which ‘hillary clinton’ was mentioned. 
As a result, some time-segments did not have a video with the 
keyword available on each day for either groups. Therefore, 
we could not construct daily time series, and resorted to 
weekly averages instead.  
B. Outlook 
Future research may focus on extending the present 
approach to measuring changes in linguistic sentiment on 
other social media platforms where alt-right supporters are 
active, such as 4Chan and Gab. It may also be of interest to 
measure concepts other than sentiment and video frequencies, 
such as hate speech and abusive language, in response to the 
Charlottesville rally and perhaps other events of interest. 
Although it is beyond the scope of the current paper, a follow-
up study of the specific contexts in which certain sentiment 
scores are observed may be highly interesting. For example, 
what exactly is being said about ‘black people’ that leads to a 
negative trend in the progressive group post-Charlottesville? 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Following the violent rally in Charlottesville, the alt-right 
received significant attention in the media and public 
discourse. As a result, we expected to see differences in social 
identity performance on part of the alt-right movement, which 
was measured through examining language use. Contrasting a 
unique dataset of YouTube video transcripts from alternative, 
                                                        
4  Similar to https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/ and 
https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-ratings but for 
YouTube channels 
right-leaning channels to progressive, left-leaning channels, 
the present investigation observed differences in temporal 
trends for the sentiment surrounding some frequent n-grams 
both within and between the alternative and progressive 
groups for the different time windows. Results potentially 
reflect political sentiment after the rally, as well as differences 
in political sentiment between the two groups more generally.  
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